From 650a37b74cbd9592cbf6f00c3268d2a86c2116d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Louis Sautier Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2015 17:15:18 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Fix typos. --- users/security.rst | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/users/security.rst b/users/security.rst index 602193839..820282f8d 100644 --- a/users/security.rst +++ b/users/security.rst @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ certificates are sent in clear text (as in HTTPS etc), meaning that the certificate Common Name (by default ``syncthing``) is visible. An eavesdropper can deduce that this is a Syncthing connection and calculate the -device ID:s involved based on the hashes of the sent certificates. +device IDs involved based on the hashes of the sent certificates. Likewise, if the sync port (default 22000) is accessible from the internet, a port scanner may discover it, attempt a TLS negotiation and thus obtain the @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ In Short Parties doing surveillance on your network (whether that be corporate IT, the NSA or someone else) will be able to see that you use Syncthing, and your device -ID's `are OK to share anyway +IDs `are OK to share anyway `__, but the actual transmitted data is protected as well as we can. Knowing your device ID can expose your IP address, using global discovery.